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STATE SALES AND USE TAXES-VARIATIONS,
EXEMPTIONS, AND THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
ROBERT C. WHITE
STATE SALES AND USE TAXES-REASONS FOR CONCERN
The reliance of state and local governments on sales and use
taxes as a major revenue source has increased dramatically in the
last forty years Prior to the 1930's the states depended almost
totally on the property tax to meet fiscal requirements.' Less than
forty years later, 16.4% of the total state and federal revenues
in the nation were generated by state general sales taxes, which
produced over 14.2 billion dollars in one year alone." The relative
importance of sales and use taxes as a source of funding for state-
provided services can only increase as reliance on the property
tax declines. To provide the increased funding, either the tax rate
must rise, or the tax base must broaden. Opting for the latter
approach, states have extended the reach of their taxes on non-
residents at the same time that constitutional restrictions on taxa-
tion of interstate commerce have been interpreted more narrowly
by the United States Supreme Court." This state action has resulted
in a lack of uniform taxation, which is significant in view of the
pervasiveness of state sales and use taxes in every facet of manu-
facturing and marketing Air carriers and aircraft manufacturers
are faced with a multitude of state sales and use tax laws which
have different effects as to accounting and reporting procedures,
the incurrence of tax liabilities for sales of goods or services, the
responsibilities of serving as tax collectors for the states, and the
application of exemptions. The granting of specific sales and use
tax exemptions to various elements of the aviation industry is corn-
1 See text accompanying notes 9-12 inf ra.
"See note 9 infra.
I ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOcAL
FINANCES: SIGNIFICANT FEATURES AND SUGGESTED LEGISLATION 4 (1972).
4 See text accompanying notes 63-110 infra.
See text accompanying notes 131-172 infra.
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mon although the different types of aviation-related exemptions
defy generalization.
This comment explores the nature of sales and use taxes, includ-
ing the difficulties in distinguishing those taxes from other types
of taxation, the relaxation of historically strict limitations on apply-
ing state sales and use taxes on interstate businesses, the problem
of lack of uniformity in application of the taxes, and the proposals
which have been made to deal with that problem. In addition, a
listing of statutory exemptions specifically applicable to the air-
craft manufacturing and air carrier industries is provided in tabular
form. Accounting and reporting procedures are not tabulated, as
they are available in forms suitable for quick reference in other
publications.' Decisions among jurisdictions do not reveal com-
prehensive principles of general applicability, and are usually
limited to their own sets of facts under specific statutes, so the
source of law is primarily statutory.
THE DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE OF SALES AND USE TAXES
There was no strong development of the sales tax until the De-
pression years.' Sharp declines in real property values and the re-
sulting loss of revenues from property taxes led state and local
governments to turn to the retail sales tax as a substitute source
of income. 0 Originally enacted as temporary emergency measures,
these taxes were found to provide a steady and reliable source of
income1 and were retained as additional, rather than alternative
revenue sources to state property taxes."
6 See table following text infra.
'[1978] STATE TAX HANDBOOK (CCH); STATE & LOCAL TAXES (BNA);
STATE TAX CASE REP. (CCH); ALL STATE SALES TAX REP. (CCH).
I See Dane, Movable Property in Interstate Commerce: How it is Subject to
Sales & Use Taxes, 48 J. TAX. 176 (1978).
9 J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 92-93 (rev. ed.
1969); D. MORGAN, RETAIL SALES TAX 3 (1964).
10 TAX FOUNDATION, INC., RETAIL SALES AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES IN
STATE TAX STRUCTURES 10, 31-32 (1962); Blaydon & Gilford, Financing the
Cities: An Issue Agenda, 1976 DuKE L.J. 1057, 1084-90, 1102; Brabson,
Economic Aspects of State Sales & Use Taxes, 32 BULL. NAT'L TAX A. 148, 154
(1947).
11 D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 8; W. LESTER, COMPARISON OF STATE REVENUE
SYSTEMS 223 (1948); Brabson, supra note 10, at 148, 154.
12TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10, at 10. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §
72-16A-1 to -34 (Supp. 1975) (general excise tax to replace emergency sales tax
COMMENTS
The current anti-tax sentiment has been directed primarily
against property taxes.13 Sales taxes possess a higher political appeal
to state legislators than property taxes.1' Consequently, it is to be
expected that state reliance on sales tax revenues will continue to
increase relative to reliance on property tax revenues, and that the
tax base will broaden as states and municipalities face increased
fiscal pressures.' The effect of base-broadening can be analyzed
only with a view to the revenue sources. An estimated fifteen to
twenty-five per cent of total sales tax revenue is paid directly by
the business sector of the economy." That businessmen express
concern over the prospect of increasing sales tax rates and bases
is hardly surprising, considering the possibility that business will
be required to assume an unequal share of the resulting tax
burden."'
in support of schools). As a result of the expansion and attractiveness of the
sales tax, over 98% of the nation's population reside in states with some form
of that levy. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra
note 3, at 4, 355 (1972).
13 Shapiro & Morgan, The General Revenue Effects of the California Property
Tax Limitation Amendment, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 119 (1978); Blaydon & Gilford,
supra note 10, at 1057-59, 1064, 1069; see Bus. WEEK, July 31, 1978, at 69-70;
Bus. WEEK, Aug. 7, 1978, at 62; 122 FORBES 35-36 (Aug. 21, 1978).
"
4 j. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 4; Reese, Local Sales Taxation-Current
Practices & Future Prospects, 70 NTA-TIA PROCEEDINGS 20 (1977); "Public
opinion seems to favor the increased use of sales taxation over property taxa-
tion. ... Id.; Break, Thrust of New Developments in Local Taxation as it
Affects Business, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA SYMPOSIUM: BUSINESS TAXES
IN STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 95, 97-98, 104 (1972). See Hill, Business
Appraisal of New Developments in Local Taxation, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA
SYMPOSIUM: BUSINESS TAXES IN STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 105, 108-09
(1972).
15ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3,
at 355; Shapiro & Morgan, supra note 13; Blaydon & Gilford, supra note 10,
at 1057, 1102. See JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCnON,
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS,
THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL, STATE & LOCAL TAXATION 83 (1947); Peters,
Supreme Court Considers Cases Dealing with Privilege Taxes Applied to Inter-
state Business, 49 J. TAX. 306 (1978); "[M]any state and local jurisdictions will
seek to impose their gross receipts taxes . . . on businesses having minimal con-
tacts with them." Id.; Leib, Sales & Use Taxation-Potential Base Broadening,
69 NTA-NIA PROCEEDINGS 157 (1976); Stocker, State & Local Taxation of
Business: An Economist's Viewpoint, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA SYMPOSIUM:
BUSINESS TAXES IN STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 37, 42 (1972).16 D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 14; Stocker, supra note 15, at 37, 42.
17TxX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10, at 9, 18-19. "The broad public inter-
est would be advanced by generally freeing business decisions from most tax
considerations." Id. at 20; Peters, supra note 15; Siska, An Appraisal from One
Business Viewpoint, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA SYMPOSIUM: BUSINESS TAXES
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Identification of sales taxes is not always an easy matter. Taxes
may be classified under diverse and overlapping labels. One tradi-
tional categorization labels a tax as either an income tax, a property
tax, or an excise tax.18 This scheme identifies taxes roughly accord-
ing to the subject of taxation, but does not address the manner
in which levies are assessed.
Excise taxes are said to be privilege taxes, while property taxes
are said to be ad valorem taxes.19 Strictly speaking, however, any
tax based on a fraction of the value of the subject of taxation is
assessed in an ad valorem manner."0 A privilege tax is levied against
participation in any activity which the taxing authority has de-
termined to be a privilege.1 Thus, both the purchase of vital sus-
tenanc& and earning the income with which to purchase it' may
be taxable as privileges under an excise tax. The former, however,
may be sales tax, and the latter an income tax, both being assessed
according to the value of the exercise of a privilege, which may
be viewed as the subject of taxation. '
The direct/indirect classification has been used to separate excise
taxes from other forms of taxation.' This distinction may be of
some assistance in determining which taxpayer among several has
the principal obligation to pay the assessment," or in evaluating
the impact of a tax upon the subject of taxation," but to one who
IN STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 27, 28-29 (1972). See S. REP. No. 658, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19591 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2548, 2550
(report of Committee on Finance to accompany S. 2524).18See Madison Suburban Util. Dist. v. Carson, 191 Tenn. 300, 232 S.W.2d
277 (1950); Note, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 380 (1974).19See Madison Suburban Util. Dist. v. Carson, 191 Tenn. 300, 232 S.W.2d
277, 280 (1950). See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 582
(1937).
2 Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 74 P.2d 47, 50 (1937); Arthur v. Johnston,
185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151, 154 (1937).
2'1Hooten v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 282, 209 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1948).
22 Id.
" Bank of Commerce & Trust v. Senter, 149 Tenn. 569, 260 S.W. 144, 145
(1924).
24 See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. S 47.305(5) (West 1970).
25 260 S.W. at 147; see Simet & Lynn, Interstate Commerce Must Pay Its
Way: The Demise of Spector, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 53, 54-55 (1978).
'*See W. LESTER, supra note 11, at 226; JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMRucAN
BAR AssoCIATIoN et al., supra note 15, at 78, 79.
2 See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1946); Simet & Lynn, supra
note 25, at 53, 56.
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pays an identifiable sum to the state there is no such thing as
an indirect tax.
Registration fees and franchise taxes are similar to excise taxes,
since they are levied against privileges of participating in specific
state-controlled conduct.' However, if they are assessed accord-
ing to the value of the thing to be registered, or the anticipated
profitability of the franchise, they are similar either to ad valorem
property taxes or to income taxes."
The confusion associated with placing a state tax into a particu-
lar category is compounded by the legal consequences which his-
torically have accompanied the labels.' A state property tax levied
against land owned by the United States and used as a residence
would violate the supremacy clause of the United States Consti-
tution."' The same revenue may be produced from the same source,
however, if the assessment is called a privilege tax and is levied
against the use of the land as a residence.'
Sales and use taxes are universally accepted to be forms of
excise taxes.' They are levied against the transfer of property,
the transfer of ownership rights to property, or the use incidental
to such a transfer.' The measure of the assessment may be based
upon the gross receipts of a vendor, the gross proceeds to a pro-
vider of services, or the value of the property which is transferred.'
Transfer of only limited types of property may give rise to the tax
liability under specific sales taxes, or alternatively, the bulk of all
conceivable property and services may be addressed by a general
sales tax.' For convenience and identification, a sales or use tax
may be distinguished from an income tax according to the economic
activity which gives rise to tax liability. A sales tax may be viewed
as a levy imposed for withdrawing goods and services from society,
2S See H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
" Id.
30 Id.; see Simet & Lynn, supra note 25, at 53, 56.
31United States v. County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452, 463-64 (1977); see U.S.
CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
See 429 U.S. at 463-64.
3Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583 (1937); Maine v. Grand
Trunk R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 217, 227 (1891).
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while an income tax is imposed for making a contribution." As
distinguished from a property tax, it may be said generally that
a single event gives rise to a sales tax, and therefore it is non-
recurring, while a property tax is periodically levied on the owner
of specific property so long as that ownership continues.*'
The burden of a sales tax includes compliance costs to business,
enforcement costs to taxing agencies, and price costs to purchasers.
Furthermore, at least some element of either a pyramid effect, or
the multiple taxation of a single exchange is inherent in the ad-
ministration of sales taxes. Compliance costs include those ad-
ministrative expenses which are placed on businesses in order to
track sales, purchases, exemptions, and the like in order to collect
and remit to the state the proper amount of the tax.' If a company
makes sales in more than one state, compliance costs multiply be-
cause of variations as to the measurement of the tax base, the
exemptions granted, and the reach of the state's taxing power
over nonresidents.' Enforcement costs include the costs to the state
in administering the tax, identifying recalcitrants, and promulgat-
ing rules and guidelines."1 If the tax is to be levied against a non-
resident taxpayer, enforcement costs increase because of the greater
likelihood of tax avoidance.'
3 See J. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 93; Blaydon & Gilford, supra note 10,
at 1051, 1084. One would do well to question whether this is strictly true, except
in a purely inelastic market. As elasticity increases, the producer bears a cor-
respondingly higher portion of the burden, and at least some degree of the
tax liability will result from his contribution of goods and services to society.
See generally C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 11 n.1, 105-09,
112 (1968) (analogy to tariffs); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 371-75 (7th ed.
1967) (microeconomic effect); C. ALLEN, ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS OF PRICE
THEORY 13-16 (1962); I. LYONS & M. SYMELMAN, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
FIRM: THEORY & PRACTICE 39-49, 119-35 (1966).
3' See generally Barrett, supra note 34, at 5, 8. This distinction breaks down
somewhat in the area of use taxes which are applied to leased property, especially
where the amount of the tax is a proportion of the value of the leasehold. In
that event, payment of the use tax becomes periodic, and closely resembles a
recurring ad valorem tax on real property.
9H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 636 (1965).
10 Id. at 636-38; JOINT COMMITrEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION et al.,
supra note 15, at 78. See N. JACOBY, RETAIL SALES TAXATION: RELATION TO
BUSINESS AND CONSUMERS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS 8 (1938); TAX FoUN-
DATION, INC., supra note 10, at 37; see also J. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 118.
41 H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 733-40 (1965); TAX FOUNDATION,
INC., supra note 10, at 37.
42TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10, at 37.
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Some degree of a pyramid effect is unavoidable with sales taxa-
tion.' If all sales are taxed, then a manufacturer who purchases
raw materials, component parts, and manufacturing equipment
will pay a sales tax on each item purchased. The tax paid will be
reflected in the price of his manufactured product, which will then
have an additional tax levied upon its increased price. Likewise, a
distributor would pay the sales tax to a manufacturer or jobber,
and an additional sales tax would be imposed upon every sale to
the ultimate customer. To avoid this problem of multiple taxation
on successive sales of a single item, all states levy their sales taxes
only against retail sales." To avoid the problem of pyramiding
taxes onto each other during the manufacturing process, states
have taken two approaches. The direct use approach excludes the
reach of the sales tax from items which are used in the manufac-
turing process.' Although this would include most heavy machinery
found in assembly lines, office and housekeeping supplies are gen-
erally not exempted.' The component parts, or integration ap-
proach exempts items which are integrated during the manufac-
turing process into larger assemblies intended for resale." The
two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Arkansas, for example,
has a general direct use exemption," and also taxes airplanes and
"navigation instruments . . . becoming a part of flight aircraft" 9
on a different basis than the general sales tax."
Use taxes are employed by all states that have sales taxes in
order to prevent evasion of the sales tax, to equalize the burdens
on interstate and intrastate transactions, and to expand the reach
of the sales tax beyond state boundaries. The use tax is comple-
I D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 7; TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10, at 24;
see BEAMAN, PAYING TAXEs TO OTHER STATES: STATE & LOCAL TAXATION OF
NON-RESIDENT BUSINESSES 13-5 (1963).
44D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 7; JOINT COMMITIEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION et al., supra note 15, at 79; see TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note
10, at 25.
1' D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 25; TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10,
at 25; JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION et al., supra note
15, at 78.
46 D. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 25.
47 Id.; JOINT COMMITIEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION et al., supra
note 15, at 78, 79.
4 8 ARx. STAT. ANN. § 84-3106(D)(2) (Supp. 1977).
49 1d. S 84-3105.1(D).
I ld. See id. at § 84-1903.
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mentary to the sales tax." Use taxes are imposed upon the exercise
of incidents of ownership of property that was not subject to the
sales tax at the time of its acquisition." Sales taxes are effectively
limited in their reach to transfers of property which occur within
the taxing jurisdiction.' This means that in cases where title and
possession both change hands outside a state, and the new owner
then transports the goods into the state for use there, the sales tax
has been avoided." The result is discrimination against intrastate
sales in favor of interstate sales, with a resulting impact on state
revenues and business activity in the taxing state." The effect is
most visible close to boundaries between states that have different
rates of taxation." To compensate for such discrepancies in the
tax burdens, all states with sales taxes have enacted compensating
use taxes.' The subject of such taxation is not the exchange of
property, but rather it is the subsequent in-state use, storage, con-
sumption, or other exercise of ownership over the property subse-
quent to the exchange." Typically, the tax is assessed against the
nonresident seller, who has the obligation to collect it from the
resident purchaser," although most statutes provide for payment
directly by the user to the state as an alternative method of col-
lection.' Fundamental constitutional issues arise in the former
5" State v. Natco Corp., 265 Ala. 184, 90 So. 2d 385 (1956); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57-40.2-04 (Supp. 1977); N. JACOBY, supra note 40, at 123, 147; Barrett,
supra note 34, at 5, 9, 20.
"2See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §5 375(a), 375(b) (1975 & Supp. 1978).
"This is true because they are privilege taxes levied against the privilege of
making a transaction within the state. See notes 33-36 supra.
'See Barrett, supra note 34, at 5, 9.
"Id.
Id. See N. JACOBY, supra note 40, at 147-57.
"National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 555 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1965); Barrett,
supra note 34, at 5, 9.
"See, e.g., LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 305(5) (West 1970):
It is, however, the intention of this Chapter to levy a tax on the
sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution, and the
storage to be used or consumed in this state, of tangible personal
property after it has come to rest in this state and has become a
part of the mass of property within this state.
Id.; NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-2703(2) (1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-18-20 (Supp.
1977); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. tit. 122A, art. 20.03 (Vernon 1969).
"gSee, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 380 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE S
57-40.2-07.3 (1972).
"See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. tit. 36, § 1951 (Supp. 1973) (liability on user
COMMENTS
context as to the state's jurisdiction to levy and enforce a tax on
a nonresidente and in the latter context as to the state's ability to
tax articles of interstate commerce. 2
LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Constitutional Limitations
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from taxing persons,
including corporations, in a manner which denies the taxpayer
equal protection or due process under the law. Phrased differently,
a state must have potential jurisdiction over a taxpayer in order
to enforce a sales or use tax." In the case of sales taxes, jurisdiction
is readily apparent. The tax is levied on transactions which occur
within the taxing state, a factor which the United States Supreme
Court has found to be determinative of the state's authority to tax:
The Federal Constitution, apart from the specific grant to the
Federal Government of the exclusive power to levy certain limited
classes of taxes and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,
leaves the states unrestricted in their power to tax those domiciled
within them, so long as the tax is imposed on property within the
state, or on privileges enjoyed there, and is not so palpably arbi-
trary or unreasonable as to infringe on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."
A state's jurisdiction to levy a use tax on an out-of-state seller,
and to require him to collect and remit the proceeds of the sale to
until proof of payment to seller); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 383 (1975) (liability
on seller, collectible from user if user has not paid seller); N.D. CENT. CODE 5
57-40.2-07.6 (1972) (user must pay state if he has not paid retailer).
"I See Peters, supra note 15, at 306; see also Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (equal protection
and due process clauses); H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-14
(1964); Talich, Solicitation Alone in Foreign State Should not Subject Taxpayer
to State Income Tax, 49 J. TAx. 112 (1978); Simet & Lynn, supra note 25; Note,
76 W. VA. L. REV. 380 (1974).
6 See Peters, supra note 15.
0Although jurisdictional requirements clearly encompass more than the four-
teenth amendment (for instance a state cannot levy a tax on the federal govern-
ment under the supremacy clause, or on interstate commerce where prohibited
by Congress), the majority of authors use "state jurisdiction to tax nonresidents"
to mean the existence of a sufficient relationship between the taxpayer and
the state to justify imposition of the tax. See generally H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 636 (1965); S. REP. No. 2524, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2548, 2550-51, 2556-57; J. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 88-91.
"Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279-80 (1922).
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the taxing state is not so obvious. Under the current United
States Supreme Court doctrine as expressed in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,' a state may enforce such a tax con-
sistently with due process requirements if the taxpayer has a
sufficient nexus with the state." In Complete Auto a Michigan
corporation was in the business of transporting trucks within
Mississippi as they arrived from Michigan. The Court found
the taxpayer's activity sufficient to make the Michigan corpora-
tion amenable to a use tax apportioned according to the transporta-
tion performed within the state."7 Subsequently, in National Geo-
graphic Society v. California Board of Equalization"6 the Court
determined that there was a sufficient nexus between the out-of-
state Society and the state of California to justify imposition of
a use tax to be collected by the taxpayer."" The tax was levied on
gross receipts obtained by mail-order sales to California residents.
The only in-state representatives of National Geographic occupied
two offices and conducted activities totally unrelated to the mail-
order sales. In upholding the tax, the Court relied heavily on the
fact that there was no danger that the taxpayer would be subjected
to multiple taxation from other states on the transactions made
with California residents, and that the burden on the taxpayer was
merely an administrative one to collect the taxes from the sub-
scribers."
The nexus requirement is an echo of the minimum contacts
jurisdictional test which has been applied to ad valorem property
taxes levied on businesses engaged in interstate transportation.
Under that doctrine a transportation company could become sub-
ject to imposition of a state ad valorem property tax levied against
its rolling stock only if it had sufficient minimum contacts with
the state.' Eighteen landings per day at various airports in Ne-
braska constituted sufficient minimum contacts to subject an air-
- 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
1i Id. at 277. Of course, the commerce clause must not be violated, even if
there is a jurisdictional nexus. See text accompanying notes 94-99 infra.
67 430 U.S. at 289.
-"430 U.S. 551 (1977).
6Id.
70 Id. at 558.
" See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Norton Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Note, 76 W. VA. L. Rv. 380, 387 (1974).
COMMENTS
line carrier to the state property tax in Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Nebraska Board of Equalization.M
Constitutional limitations on state use taxation under the com-
merce clause have been relaxed greatly by the Complete Auto
analysis. Early in the twentieth century state taxes levied against
businesses engaged in interstate commerce were evaluated under
a directness-of-burdens analysis."' Property taxes were upheld as
an indirect burden on interstate commerce, while gross receipts
taxes were held to be an unconstitutional direct burden." In 1938,
following the widespread emergence of state sales and use taxes,
the Court began to move away from this analysis in favor of an
approach designed to eliminate state discrimination against inter-
state commerce.m Under this multiplicity-of-burdens approach,
statutes which subjected a corporation to tax liability in more than
one jurisdiction were determined to be discriminatory and were
struck down." A state could save its statute by means of a formula
which would apportion the tax fairly, according to the services
provided by the state." In regard to domiciliary interstate corpora-
tions, no apportionment was necessary to subject all of a corpora-
tion's property to a recurring ad valorem tax, since there was no
danger of the same tax being levied by a jurisdiction other than
the state of domicile.m
The multiplicity-of-burdens test was short-lived. Deciding the
1944 case of Freeman v. Hewit,7 ' the Supreme Court held that a
gross receipts tax on a state resident for sales occurring out of the
state was unconstitutional as a direct burden on interstate com-
merce.* Freeman has been cited both as a case representative of
t2347 U.S. 590 (1954).
" Simet & Lynn, supra note 25, at 54-55; Note, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 380, 381-
82 (1974). See 430 U.S. at 274.
74 Simet & Lynn, supra note 25, at 54-55; see Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459
(1919); United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
' Hellerstein, State Taxation under the Commerce Clause: An Historical
Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 336-37 (1976).
78 Simet & Lynn, supra note 25, at 55; Hellerstein, supra note 75, at 336-37.
"See note 76 supra; Note, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 380, 384 (1974); see also
Western Livestock, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
8 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294, 298 (1944).
79 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
0 Id.
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the multiplicity-of-burdens test' and as the beginning of an oscilla-
tion back to the directness-of-burdens test." In any event, the return
did occur, and with predictably formalistic results.' The decision in
Spector Motor Services, Inc. v. O'Connor" coupled the directness-
of-burdens test with the announcement that a statute which imposed
a tax on the privilege of doing interstate business would be viola-
tive of the commerce clause."5 Such a tax was struck down in the
case known as Railway Express r' in which Virginia had levied
a gross receipts tax on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce.
The commonwealth rewrote the measure as a property tax levied
against the value of the rolling stock, but the amount and the
source of revenue remained unchanged. When the tax resurfaced
in Railway Express H8" it was upheld, the Court again basing its
decision on the Spector analysis."
The multiplicity-of-burdens test for discrimination against inter-
state commerce was retained for state net income taxes. In North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota"9 the Supreme
Court issued a clear statement that fairly apportioned state income
taxes levied against foreign corporations would be upheld, pro-
vided that a sufficient nexus existed between the corporation and
the state." The congressional reaction was to enact Pub. L. No.
86-272"' which established minimum jurisdictional standards for
state imposition of a net income tax." Congress also commissioned
a joint subcommittee of the judiciary to study all forms of state
taxation on interstate commerce."
8177 Stat. 437 (codified in 15 U.S.C. §5 381 to 384 (1976)).
82 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976). See notes 173-184 and accompanying text infra.
S ld. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 610-15
(1951) (Clark, J., dissenting); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977).
- 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
85 Id.
86 Railway Express v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954).
87 Railway Express v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
8 Id.
89 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
90 Id. at 452.
9177 Stat. 437 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 3$ 381 to 384 (1976)).
85Id. 5 381. See notes 173-184 and accompanying text infra.
93Act of Apr. 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 86-17, § 201, 75 Stat. 41. See H.R. REP.
No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1964).
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Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady" rejected Spector and
placed state use taxes on the same constitutional footing as income
taxes on nonresident taxpayers" by the Court's application of its
approach taken in Northwestern States to a use tax based on gross
receipts." In addition to the jurisdictional nexus requirement,"
Complete Auto set out three criteria relating to interstate com-
merce and state taxation of nonresidents." It was determined that
use taxes would not violate the commerce clause if the following
were met: (1) they did not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; (2) the assessments were fairly apportioned to the amount
of business conducted in the state; and (3) there existed a fair
relation between the tax and state-provided services."
In addition to being limited by the due process clause and the
commerce clause, state taxation of nonresidents may be limited
by the privileges and immunities clause!0 The only case squarely
on point is Crandall v. Nevada,' in which a state tax of one
dollar per person was levied against those desiring to exit the
state by public or private carriers. The Supreme Court found inter-
state travel to be a privilege of United States citizenship, and the
tax upon the privilege was voided as burdening the exercise of
that fundamental constitutional right.1" Although Crandall was de-
cided prior to the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the
subsequently decided Slaughterhouse Cases' indicated that the
right to freedom of interstate travel was included within the amend-
ment's privilege and immunities clause, and thus protected from
- 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
"Peters, supra note 15.
"The Supreme Court had previously determined that Pub. L. No. 86-272
did not establish jurisdictional standards with respect to sales, use, or franchise
taxes. H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1964). See Scripto, Inc. v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
11 See notes 63-67 and accompanying text supra.
9430 U.S. at 277-79, 287.
99 Id.
'00 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 provides, in pertinent part: "All per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States . .. are citizens of the United States
.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States ....
01 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
102Id.
1- 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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state infringement.1"' In the years since Crandall, the right to travel
has become associated with the first amendment right to freedom
of association, with fundamental liberty under the due process
clause, and with the commerce clause.'" In Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority District v. Delta Air Lines' a tax of one dollar
per person was levied on all outbound passengers using a municipal
airport. The tax was upheld and Crandall was distinguished on
the ground that the Vanderburgh tax was for the use of state-
provided facilities, whereas the Crandall tax applied to both pub-
lic and private transporters.!"7 It is at least arguable that Crandall
has been overruled."" Sales to the federal government, of course,
are not reached by state sales or use taxes,1" and Congress may
act pursuant to its enumerated powers to prohibit state sales and
use taxes on articles of interstate commerce.'1*
Congressionally Imposed Limitations
There is no comprehensive congressional action dealing with
the arena of state sales and use taxes. 1 ' The only comprehensive
measure dealing with any area of state taxation is Pub. L. No.
86-272."' It was intended to be a temporary measure and was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in North-
western States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota.' As noted
previously, the statute affects only state net income taxes, and
does not address sales or use taxes." ' Although the measure was
intended to identify specific acts which would give rise to the
jurisdictional nexus, there is some indication that states have
"See id. at 79; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
105 J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
264-66, 668-74 (1978 & Supp.).
10 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
"0T Id, at 714.
10 Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
o See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 370 (1978).
110 This is exactly what Congress did in reaction to Evansville-Vanderburgh.
See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976).
"' See text accompanying notes 173-234 infra.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976).
"1'358 U.S. 450 (1959); see S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2548, 2549.
"4 See Reese, supra note 14.
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seized upon the statutory language to deny taxing jurisdiction to
sister states, thereby increasing their own revenues."1 Numerous
bills have been introduced to deal with sales and use taxation, to
define jurisdictional nexus, and to provide comprehensive schemes
of sales and use taxation on a national level.1" With the exception
of the current attempt of the Ninety-sixth Congress,"' all the bills
have died in committee.
State Imposed Limitations
States have limited the reach of their sales and use taxes in a
number of ways through their courts and legislatures. State courts
may construe nexus requirements more restrictively than the United
States Supreme Court. Maryland appears to have done this in
W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller."' The state supreme court de-
termined that an airplane flown into Maryland, hangared there,
and flown totally in interstate commerce was not amenable to state
taxation under the commerce clause of the United States Consti-
tution. " ' The case is probably an aberration, and other states have
reached the opposite conclusion under similar facts."'
The statutory definition of a sale limits the reach of a sales tax.
If a sale is considered in the buyer's state to be the transfer of
possession, and in the seller's state to be a transfer of title, then
the sales tax may be avoided by accepting delivery on a consign-
ment basis in the seller's state, with title to vest in the buyer upon
his return home with the property.'' The same thing could be
accomplished under the Uniform Commercial Code by purchasing
free on board, place of shipment." The folly of this scheme is
1"5S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2548, 2549, 2550-51; see Talich, supra note 61.
"'See, e.g., H.R. 5988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2173, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); S. 282, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2811, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973).
1"H.R. 5, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
118255 Md. 550, 258 A.2d 740 (1969); see Dane, supra note 8, at 177.
119 258 A.2d at 743.
10 See, e.g., Management Servs., Inc. v. Spradling, 547 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.
1977); American Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 216 Cal. App. 2d
180, 30 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1963); see generally Dane, supra note 8, at 177.
121 See Barrett, supra note 34, at 13-14.
22 U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (a) provides:
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with
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that the compensating use tax in the buyer's state will impose the
same tax as the sales tax would have imposed, had the exchange
of possession taken place in the buyer's state."' Additionally, the
use tax in the seller's state could apply to delivery on consign-
ment, even though title were retained in the seller as a security
interest until the property had left the seller's state.'24
The most common manner for states to limit their sales and
use taxes is in granting exemptions. It is important that exemptions
be clearly identified in the statutory scheme, because the burden of
proving entitlement to relief under specific exemptions is on the
taxpayer."u The state's power to select items for specific exemptions
is almost absolute, 18 and they usually reflect political decisions to
achieve socially desirable goals through manipulation of the eco-
nomic effects of taxation. '2 Sales taxes long have been thought to
be regressive-that is, the lower one's expendable income is, the
greater is the portion of that income which is absorbed by payment
of the tax.1' Therefore, commonly exempted items include food,
medical supplies, and other items considered to be basic necessities
reference to the physical delivery of the goods ...
(a) if the contract requires or authorizes the seller to send the
goods to the buyer but does not require him to deliver them at
destination, title passes to the buyer at the time and place of
shipment ....
U.C.C. S 2-319(1)(a) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed the term F.O.B. (which means "free
on board") at a named place, even though used only in connection
with the stated price, is a delivery term under which
(a) when the term is F.O.B. the place of shipment, the seller
must at that place ship the goods in the manner provided in this
Article... and bear the expense and risk of putting them into the
possession of the carrier ....
"2 See Barrett, supra note 34, at 14.
u4See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1752(11) (1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 372(d) (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-16A-3F (Supp. 1965).
1" 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S 66.01 (4th
ed. 1974); see Brundidge Milling Co. v. State, 45 Ala. App. 208, 228 So. 2d
475 (1969); Peters, Several State Supreme Court Cases Increase Tax Liability
of Interstate Firms, 46 J. TAX. 174, 176 (1977).
121 International Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435
(1944); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
17See J. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 96 (noting increase in administrative
costs caused by exemptions).
28 See id.; TAX FOUNDATION, INC., supra note 10, at 29, 33.
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of life."29 Often, however, exemptions are granted under the general
sales or use tax only to be levied again as specific excises. '
THE PROBLEM OF VARIANCE AMONG THE STATES
Most characteristic of state sales and use taxation is the lack
of uniformity among the states. Although some attempts have been
made to attain a degree of uniformity in the application of state
taxes, particularly in the area of interstate audits, their success
has been minimal. One of the factors contributing to the lack of
effective national action is the deference shown to states'
sovereignty in the area of sales and use taxation.
The greatest variance among state sales and use taxes is in the
determination of which items are subject to the tax and which
items are exempt. The manner in which statutory exemptions are
drafted may affect the allocation of the burden of proof in specific
controversies. While taxing statutes are construed in favor of the
taxpayer, and against the taxing authority, the opposite is true of
exemptions."' An illustrative contrast is provided by the Maryland
case W. R. Grace & Co. v. Comptroller,"" the Washington case
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Department of Revenue," and the Ten-
nessee case of Federal Express Corp. v. Woods." All three cases
involved application of a state use tax to aircraft used principally
in interstate travel. W. R. Grace was decided primarily on federal
constitutional grounds. The Maryland court determined that the
commerce clause prevented imposition of the state use tax on an
airplane based in the state because the only local activity in which
the plane was used was part of longer interstate flight.' As an
alternative basis for its decision, the court determined that the
129E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1760 (1978) (food); IowA CODE
ANN. § 422.45(12) (1979) (food); id. § 422.45(13) (drugs); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 6-2-1-39(b)(2) (Supp. 1978) (wrapping materials).
23OSee, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1760(10) (1978).
221 Peters, supra note 125, at 176; see Brundidge Milling Co. v. State, 45 Ala.
App. 208, 228 So. 2d 475 (1969); 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 125, at §§ 66.01,
66.09. But cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1763 (1978) (taxpayer must show non-
liability-no distinction between imposition clause and exemptions).
1-255 Md. 550, 258 A.2d 740 (1960).
23290 Wash. 2d 191, 580 P.2d 262 (1978).
224569 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1978).
135 258 A.2d at 747.
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word "storage" as contained in the use tax statute"" connoted re-
moval from service, and the Maryland-based aircraft, although
hangared in the state, had never been removed from service since
its importation."' Therefore, the court reasoned that the use tax
did not reach the privilege of hangaring the craft in the state."'
Pope & Talbot presented a situation similar to that in W. R.
Grace. An airplane was hangared in Oregon, but was flown occa-
sionally on intrastate trips within Washington, remaining there over-
night. The principal use of the plane was to transport executives
between Washington and Oregon. 9 After the Washington use tax' *
was assessed against the corporate owners, they sought relief on
the theory that the assessment violated the commerce clause."
The state supreme court declined to reach the constitutional issue,
holding that the levy was not encompassed within the assessment
provisions of the taxing statute.' That provision contained an
exclusion from taxation "with respect to the use of any article of
tangible personal property purchased ...outside this state until
the transportation of such article has finally ended....
Neither Tennessee's definition of "use " '" nor its statute which
imposes a use tax' contains language similar to that in the Wash-
ington statute.' Tennessee does provide a separately detailed
exemption from its tax, however, for repair parts used for "aircraft
[which] are used exclusively in interstate or international com-
merce." " In Federal Express' the full use tax on repair parts
was assessed against an air cargo carrier, despite the fact that it
flew exclusively interstate routes.'" The fact that successive intra-
'"MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, S 373 (Supp. 1978).
17 258 A.2d at 747.
i8 Id.
139 90 Wash. 2d 191, 580 P.2d 262 (1978).
140WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 82.12.020 (Supp. 1978).
141 580 P.2d at 263.
"I Id. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 82.12.020 (Supp. 1978).
"a'WASH. REV. CODE ANN. S 82.12.020 (Supp. 1978).
'"See TENN. CODE ANN. S 67-3002(h) (1976).
'Id. § 67-3003 (Supp. 1978).
'"Compare WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.12.020 (Supp. 1978) with TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 67-3002(h), 67-3003 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
1
47
TENN. CODE ANN. S 67-3012(7) (Supp. 1978).
1 4 569 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1978).
149 Id. at 409.
COMMENTS
state cargo pick-ups and deliveries were completed as part of
those interstate routes was held sufficient to deny the corporation
the benefit of the exemption."
From a review of these three cases it is apparent that the loca-
tion of a statute's excluding provisions-whether they are in the
assessment portion or listed as exemptions---can be significant in
determining a taxpayer's liability. This is especially evident in
view of the susceptibility of Tennessee's exemption' to an alterna-
tive, more lenient interpretation which would have resulted in
nonliability for the air carrier in Federal Express."' The com-
parison also brings into focus a problem which confronts business-
men who conduct operations spanning state boundaries. In order
to take advantage of a statutory exclusion from taxation of a
particular activity, not only must the businessman become inti-
mately familiar with the exclusionary language in more than one
statute,' but also he must predict the probable judicial interpreta-
tions of the language in more than one state, basing his prediction
in part on the location of the language within the taxing statute.
Even a cursory perusal of statutory exemptions to state sales
and use taxes reveals the magnitude of the task as it confronts
purchasers, sellers, users, and owners of aircraft and aircraft
equipment. The Arkansas use tax does not extend to aircraft which
were brought into the state for refurbishing, conversion, or modi-
fication, so long as the process does not require more than sixty
days. ' The exclusion applies as well to aircraft repair parts and
navigational equipment." The sales tax does apply to the materials
used in refurbishing."' A separate tax of three per cent of the gross
purchase price is imposed on airplanes and "navigational instru-
ments used directly in or becoming part of flight aircraft... in regu-
50 Id. at 409, 410-11.
'" TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3012(7) (Supp. 1978).
"'See 569 S.W.2d at 410 (Fones, J., dissenting).
'See generally H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 672, 673 (1965);
Dane, supra note 8, at 176-79; Nelson & Johnson, New Method for Keeping
Track of State Income Tax Liability or Refunds, 20 TAX. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 36
(Jan. 1978); MacCrate, The Retail Sales and Use Tax "Plague", 32 BULL.
NAT'L TAX A. 179, 179-80 (1947).
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lar scheduled intrastate or interstate common carrier transporta-
tion."'' 7 Another separate sales tax based on gross proceeds is im-
posed on the service of aircraft repair.' Georgia exempts from its
use tax aircraft and repair parts for aircraft owned by authorized
common carriers used principally to cross the borders to the state
to transport passengers or cargo.' Additionally, the state exempts
transportation made "in connection with' ' .0 interstate commerce.16'
Connecticut exempts sales of aircraft to certified interstate air car-
riers..2 but generally imposes its use tax on casual sales of aircraft,'
and also levies a specific "Air Carrier Tax" under a provision apart
from its general sales tax.'
Greater harmony among states is found in their exclusions de-
signed to prevent multiple taxation and pyramiding of taxes as
products progress through stages of manufacture and resale.'
In this regard, aircraft manufacturers are not different from those
in other industries, in that they need to be aware of whether the
applicable statutes follow a direct use exemption or a component
part exemption. While most sales tax statutes include a relatively
clear statement of the general approach followed by the particular
state,'" other states have so particularized their exemptions that
the two approaches have become merged, with the approaches
varying according to the particular product being taxed."' In that
circumstance, manufacturers also face the alternatives of com-
"
7 Id. 5 84-3105.1(D).
Id. 5 84-1903(c)(3).
"
9 GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3402aC(2)(q) (Supp. 1978).
'6Id. S 92-3403aC(2)(j) (Supp. 1978).
"' Id. § 92-1501a (1974).
'CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-412(t) (1979).
3 d. § 12-431 (1979). Cf. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, S 1764 (1965).
' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-243 (1979).
5 See text at notes 42-50 supra.
" See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, S 439.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978):
"Use ... does not mean the physical incorporation of tangible personal property,
to the extent not first subjected to a use for which it was purchased, as an
ingredient or constituent, into another tangible personal property (a) which is
sold in the regular course of business ... .
'See, e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6001 (West 1970); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 237-4(2), 237-13(2)(A) (1976); see generally D. MORGAN, supra note
9, at 16-21.
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plying with the requirements of the specific exemption, or facing
unexpected tax liability."'
The lack of uniformity among states in all areas of taxation
has long been a source of objections from businessmen, state tax
administrators, congressmen, and the bar. Faced with differing
rates, assessments, exemptions, and administrative requirements,
businesses engaged in interstate commerce often incur the expense
of complicated accounting procedures, and multiple reporting
and audit requirements. " ' This expense is in addition to the burden
of staying abreast of the substantive tax laws in every jurisdiction
in which the business operates, which itself is a considerable task.'"
In fact, it has been suggested that state autonomy in the area of
taxation necessarily discriminates against interstate commerce be-
cause wholly intrastate enterprises need not be concerned with the
expense of multiple administrative, legislative, and judicial regula-
tion."' The impact of the burden is not limited to a few giant multi-
national corporations, but rather extends to the vast majority of
all businesses in the country.
7 2
Recognizing the problem of state taxation variance, and view-
ing the cause as a lack of uniformly defined state jurisdiction to
tax nonresident taxpayers, the United States Supreme Court has
called repeatedly for congressional action to establish a single
jurisdictional standard applicable to every state.' The Congress,
108 See generally J. MARTIN, TACKLING THE CONFLICTS IN TAXATION 1 (March
1, 1935) (address to the American Legislator's Association and the Council of
State Governments--monograph).
169 Nelson & Johnson, supra note 153; see State Income Tax Withholding for
Interstate Transportation Employees: Hearing on H.R. 1240, H.R. 10,634, H.R.
11,882, and H.R. 13,612 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aero-
nautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1970) (statement of John E. Moss) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Trans-
portation Hearing]; id. at 49 (statement of Eugene Corrigan); id. at 52 (state-
ment of Vernon L. Snow); S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (to accompany
S. 2524), reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD, NEWS 2548, 2550.
170 See Barrett, supra note 34, at 21-27; Glaser, Problems in Sales Tax Ad-
ministration: The Tax Administrator's Views, 70 NTA-TIA PROCEEDINGS 39
(1977).
'1' H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 673, 835 (1965); see 1970 Trans-
portation Hearing, supra note 169, at 18 (statement of William H. Martin);
MacCrate, supra note 153.
"I See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81, 90 (1964); see also
H.R. REP. No. 69 (to accompany H.R. 2158), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
173 H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14 (1964); Celler, The De-
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however, declined to act for 170 years. " When action was taken,
it was in response to Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota... in which the Court allowed state imposition of an
apportioned income tax on a nonresident business.' Two results
flowed from the congressional reaction. The first was the 1959
enactment of Pub. L. No. 86-272'"' which established specific
criteria for a business to meet in order to have a sufficient nexus
with a state to be subject to its jurisdiction for state income tax
purposes." The second result was that a congressional study was
commissioned to conduct an exhaustive review of all state taxation
of interstate commerce, and to recommend legislation to resolve
problems caused by non-uniform statutes.'" Almost four years
later the four volume report was published, spanning two sessions
of Congress.'" The recommended action was not limited to juris-
dictional matters, which was the primary thrust of Pub. L. No.
86-272. On the contrary, the report urged adoption of a national
scheme of taxation, including sales and use taxation, with cen-
tralized auditing and other administration, to replace state sales
and use taxes on interstate commerce."'
The interests of the respective states had not lain fallow during
the period in which the study was taking place. In fact, prior to
any congressional consideration of the matter, both the bar and
many state tax administrators had begun to call for uniformity
in state taxation.' In the area of state income taxes, the only
broadly based support for uniform legislation was a move for the
velopment of a Congressional Program Dealing with State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 385 (1968).
74 Celler, supra note 173.
358 U.S. 450 (1959).
176 See id.
17773 Stat. 555 (1959) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976)).
'78 15 U.S.C. S 381 (1976).
171 Pub. L. No. 87-17, 75 Stat. 41 (1961).
9' See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (v. 1, 2); H.R. REP.
No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (v. 3, 4) [hereinafter cited as Willis Report].
8' Willis Report, supra note 180, at 889-92.
"' JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION et al., supra note
15, at 3, 7, 8, 81; AMERICAN LEGISLATOR'S ASSOCIATION & COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, CONFLICTING TAXATION: THE 1935 PROGRESS REPORT OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMISSION ON CONFLICTING TAXATION 179, 184-85 (1935);
MacCrate, supra note 153; Goodman, The Goodman Plan for Coordinating
Aviation Taxes and Controls, 31 BULL. NAT'L TAX A. 208 (1946).
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acceptance of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act. '83 That legislation, in states which have enacted it, has not
been wholly successful. 8 ' Born in the name of state sovereignty,
and dedicated to resist federal preemption of state taxation, the
Multistate Tax Compact was promulgated." The purposes of the
Compact, which has been enacted by nineteen states,88 are to:
1. Facilitate proper determination of state and local tax lia-
bility of multistate taxpayers, including the equitable apportion-
ment of tax bases and settlement of apportionment disputes.
2. Promote uniformity or compatibility in significant com-
ponents of tax systems.
3. Facilitate taxpayer convenience and compliance in the filing
of tax returns and in other phases of tax administration.
4. Avoid duplicative taxation."'
To accomplish its purposes, the Compact provides for appor-
tionment of income among states according to a three-factor
formula,'88 a credit for use taxes paid to other states,'88 availability
1'3 Boren, Specific Allocation of Corporate Income in California: Some Prob-
lems in the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes, 30 TAx L. REV. 607,
608-09 (1975).
'MId. at 607-700. See A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Report of Committee on
State & Local Taxes, 30 TAx LAw. 898 (1977).
85 Multistate Tax Comm'n, The Multistate Tax Compact (circa 1968)
(pamphlet); "The Compact is the states' answer to Federal control of state taxing
policies and programs." Id. at 1; "It is increasingly apparent that the state-
controlled and state-operated Multistate Tax Commission stands as the sole
alternative to an ultimate federal takeover [of state taxation of interstate busi-
nesses]." Multistate Tax Newsletter, Aug. 1972, No. 32 at 5, col. 2.
188 ALASKA STAT. SS 43.19.010 to 43.19.50 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4101
(Supp. 1977); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 19286, 25138, 26453c, 38001, 38006
(West 1970 & Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. §5 24-60-1301 to 24-60-1307
(1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 255-1, 255-3, 231-18 (1976); IDAHO CODE S 63-3701
(1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. 55 79-4301 to 79-4307 (1977); MIcH. CoMP. LAws
ANN. § 205.581 (Supp. 1978-1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. S 32.200 (Vernon 1969
& Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 15-1-601 to 15-1-604 (1978); NEB.
REV. STAT. S 77-2901 (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 376.010 (1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN. 5 72-15A-37 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 57-59-01 (1972); OR. REV.
STAT. 5 305.655 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-54-1 to 10-54-4
(Supp. 1978); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7359(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-22-1 (1953 & Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5
82.56.010 (Supp. 1978).87 MULj.sTAT TAx COMPACT, art. 1.
'
88 Id., art. IV, S 9. The tripartite computation applies only to allocation of
state income taxes.
189 Id., art. V, § 1.
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of interstate audits,'" resolution of disputes through an arbitration
panel,'' and adoption of uniform regulations by a commission
composed of representatives from the adopting states."' The Com-
pact does not, however, contain any jurisdictional definition of
nexus for the purpose of taxation of nonresidents," a deficiency
which Congress has attempted repeatedly to correct through fed-
eral legislation."'
Since the 1965 publication of Congress' study on state taxation,
a multitude of bills has been introduced to provide uniform state
taxation of interstate commerce. The report's immediate progeny
was H.R. 11,798,1 which failed to pass the House in 1966.'"
The bill was reintroduced in 1968 as H.R. 2158"' and passed the
House, but died in the Senate Finance Committee."' The bill
dropped the proposal for centralized sales and use tax administra-
tion on the national level, and proposed a statutory definition of
the jurisdictional nexus requirement to be applied to state sales and
use taxes.' To achieve uniformity, the bill would have denied
states the jurisdiction:
(2) to require a person to collect a sales or use tax with respect
to a sale of tangible personal property unless the person has a
business location in the State or regularly makes household de-
liveries in the State; or
(3) to impose a gross receipts tax with respect to a sale of
tangible personal property unless the seller has a business loca-
tion in the State.2 '
Proponents of the measure argued that this limitation was noth-
ing more than an acknowledgement of realistic limitations on a
"90Id., art. VIII.
191 d., art. IX.
192 Id., arts. VI, VII (states free to reject regulations).
1" See MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art. VII; Celler, supra note 173, at 399.
'"See note 116 supra, and accompanying text.
I"H.R. 11,798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
1" An identical bill was also submitted, but failed to pass the House. See
H.R. 16,491, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
"9'H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
1" The bill was reported with amendments from the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, but was not reported out of the Senate Finance Committee. See H.R. REP.
No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (to accompany H.R. 2158).
10' See Celler, supra note 173, at 393.
"'H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1967).
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state's ability to enforce its tax against nonresidents.' Further-
more, where states did enforce the collection of use taxes by
nonresidents, it was felt that varying degrees and exercises of
prosecutorial discretion created inequities among business tax-
payers.' The single jurisdictional standard was intended, according
to its apologists, to eliminate the inequities, which was to result
in increased voluntary compliance with state taxes, which, in turn,
was to lead to a swelling of the public coffers.'
That states are severely constrained by practicalities of enforce-
ment from requiring nonresident sellers to collect and remit use
taxes is a facially suspect proposition. In the first instance, the
zeal with which states pursue such taxpayers is readily apparent
merely from the proliferation of case law on the subject.' It may
be presumed as axiomatic that no businessman would incur the
expenses of protracted legal battles over assessment of taxes if
he believed that the levies could not be executed. Nor would state
tax administrators be likely to pursue judgment-proof taxpayers
so long as they operate on a budget which is determined accord-
ing to the amount of revenue they produce for the state.' Tax-
payers who own tangible property in the taxing state jeopardize
their continued ownership by refusal to pay taxes."' Other methods
of enforcement available to a state include reciprocal enforcement
agreements with other states, ' establishment of extraterritorial
20'See Celler, supra note 173, at 392; "[T]he present jurisdictional assertions
of the states cannot be complied with by small and moderate-size companies and
in fact are beyond the enforcement capabilities of the states themselves." Id.
m H.R. REP. No. 69, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) (to accompany H.R.
2158); see Celler, supra note 173, at 389.
'See Celler, supra note 173, at 389. See also Willis Report, supra note 180,
at 637, 729, 1127; Boren, supra note 183, at 608; Luckett, An Appraisal from
the Viewpoint of a State Tax Administrator, TAX INSTITUTE OF AMERICA SYM-
POSIUM: BUSINESS TAXES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 22 (1972).
See generally Dane, supra note 8.
"'See generally, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-3128 (1960) (administrative
collection agency limited to a budget of 3% of total revenues actually produced),
11 See, e.g., Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Benson, 444 S.W.2d 137 (Tenn.
1969); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 47:313B (West 1970) (transporter subject to
confiscation of goods and vehicle if neither use taxes paid nor permit obtained);
MINN. STAT. ANN. SS 297A.40, 297A.15(4) (West 1972 & Supp. 1979) (lien on
all real property owned by taxpayer-vehicles subject to confiscation if use tax
not paid on cargo).
207 See [1979] STATE TAX GUIDE-ALL STATES (CCH) 5 30.
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state field tax offices, including tax auditors,""8 and arbitration under
the Multistate Tax Compact.' Arbitration under the Compact is
limited, however, and applies only to matters concerning appor-
tionment of state income taxes.
10
The other objective of H.R. 2158, voluntary compliance with
state use taxes from multistate businesses,"' thereby reducing in-
equities of selective enforcement,"' has been echoed by business-
men and state tax administrators."' Agreement on the best means
to achieve the objective, however, has not been reached."" In
the absence of a definite jurisdictional standard, it is unlikely that
the Multistate Tax Compact can achieve this goal."" Nor can a
uniform definition of jurisdiction enacted by Congress achieve it,
208 See Celler, supra note 173, at 389; Willis Report, supra note 180, at 637,
729, 1127.
29 See MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art. IX. Another coercive means of collect-
ing the taxes is to deny state benefits to taxpayers who are remiss in their re-
mittances. A South Carolina statute, for example, provides that "No action,
either in law or equity, on a sale or transaction subject to a tax imposed by this
chapter, may be had in the State by any nonresident seller, unless it be affirma-
tively shown that the provisions of this chapter have been fully complied with."
S.C. CODE S 12-35-1450 (1977).
ZI Johnson, Current Interstate Tax Arbitration Opportunities, REVENUB
ADMINISTRATION 1969-37TH CONFERENCE OF THE NAT'L ASSOCIATION OF TAX
ADMINS. 50 (1969). See MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT, art. IX.
21 See Willis Report, supra note 180, at 637, 729, 1127; Celler, supra note
173, at 389.
"'. See note 202 supra.
21 See J. MAXWELL, supra note 9, at 118; JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE AMERI-
CAN BAR ASSOCIATION et al., supra note 15, at 81; Luckett, supra note 203, at
22; J. MARTIN, supra note 168, at 2. See generally Comptroller General of the
United States, Suggested State Auditing Acts and Constitutional Amendments
(1974) (pamphlet); Boren, supra note 183, at 608.
214 "In our view State solutions are much to be preferred to federal legislation,
principally on the grounds of Federal-State comity. Federal legislation would
unavoidably interfere with well-established jurisdictional rules in State and local
taxation." 1970 Transportation Hearing, supra note 169, at 5 (statement of
William G. Colman);
I do not expect to see uniformity in the tax laws of the states, in
fact I don't believe we should have total uniformity. I believe that
each state has the right to tax in the manner that it thinks best
for the people of its state. But, wouldn't it be nice if all those states
that exempt food from sales tax, agreed on what constituted food.
Rosenblum, Sales Tax Administrative Problems from the Business Viewpoint,
70 NTA-TIA PROCEEDINGS 38 (1977); Glaser, supra note 170 (objection to con-
gressionally established "business location" test for any state tax jurisdiction);
Barrett, supra note 34, at 26-27 (favoring congressional action); Boren, supra
note 183, at 608 (favoring congressional action).
"' See generally Celler, supra note 173, at 389.
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if that definition is uniformly vague. This criticism, which has
been leveled at the income tax jurisdictional standard in Pub. L.
No. 86-272"' is applicable to any standard which is enforceable
in more than one jurisdiction, and which is susceptible to more
than one interpretation.'17 Congress has contributed to the per-
petuation of this problem through the Tax Injunction Act.' 8 This
statute denies United States District Courts the authority to "en-
join, suspend or restrain the assessment... of any tax under State
law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.""' The effect of the statute is to require dis-
putes over state taxation to be resolved in a state forum rather
than a federal forum.'" The statute applies to use taxes,"' and
prevents exercise of federal jurisdiction over state tax disputes
even though federal constitutional issues are present, so long as
the state provides an adequate remedy for the taxpayer.' There-
fore, courts of different states construing identical or similar statu-
tory language are likely to arrive at different conclusions as to a
taxpayer's liability for use taxes." Nonetheless, and despite the
defeat of H.R. 2158," the primary thrust of subsequent congres-
sional action has been to propose a uniform state jurisdictional
standard.
During the Ninety-fifth Congress three bills were introduced to
provide such a standard." One of these merely would have re-
16 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976); see ABA TAX. SECTION BULL. 46 (Jan. 1962).
2"1 See generally Dane, supra note 8; Pratt, How to Use Federal Courts to
Enjoin the Collection of State and Local Taxes, 46 J. TAx. 178, 178-81 (1977).
21828 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1976). See generally Pratt, supra note 217, at 178-80.
1928 U.S.C. 5 1341 (1976).
"'See Pratt, supra note 217, at 178-80.
"2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roddewig, 24 F. Supp. 321 (S.D. Iowa 1938).
"'Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68 (1976); Johnson v. Wells Fargo & Co.,
239 U.S. 234 (1915) (construing earlier version); Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494
F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Kistner v. Milliken, 432 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Mich 1977).
8 See Dane, supra note 8.
"'See note 198 supra.
2"H.R. 669, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); S. 2174, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977); H.R. 11,525, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). Other bills were introduced
to reform the areas of state income and property taxation. See H.R. 690, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (income); H.R. 5988, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
(income); H.R. 7247, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (income); H.R. 13,621, 95th.
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (property); S. 3409, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(property).
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moved tax immunity from municipal airports, clearing the way for
state and local "transaction taxes" on the facilities. '" The other
two bills, one of which was introduced in the Senate'7 and the
other in the House,"' would have wreaked major reforms in state
sales and use taxation. The House bill contained a uniform juris-
dictional standard identical to its ancestor of the Ninetieth Con-
gress, H.R. 2158. "' The standard was not to have been applicable
to interstate air carriers, however, since the bill excluded from its
coverage most businesses engaged in "[t]ransportation for hire of
property or passengers, including the rendering by the transporter
of services incidental to such transportation."' The Senate bill
was to provide guidelines to federal claims courts in resolving
state tax disputes.' ' Its jurisdictional standards were identical to
those in the House bill, except in regard to gross receipts taxes.
Under the Senate's proposal, gross receipts taxes would have been
allowed against nonresident businesses only if the sale were "so-
licited directly through a business office of the seller in the State."'
The inclusion of the solicitation requirement would subject the bill
to the same criticism as Pub. L. No. 86-272,' which also uses
solicitation as the requirement for exercise of state income tax
jurisdiction over nonresidents, except for the distinguishing fea-
ture of the Senate proposal, that the Federal Claims Court was to
have jurisdiction to hear the disputes. ' It was, however, the pro-
posed jurisdiction by a federal court over state taxing statutes which
caused the American Bar Association to oppose the bill as an
unwarranted infringement on state powers.m
The Ninety-fourth Congress saw the introduction of eight bills
dealing with the unification of state taxing measures, and the
22
6 H.R. 11,525, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1978).
127S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
221H.R. 669, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-305 (1977).
229Id. at S 101; see H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1968).
nOH.R. 669, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1977).
21S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2 Id. at 8; see A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Report of the Committee on
State and Local Taxes, 31 TAx LAw. 982 (1978).
- 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
' See S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1977); Talich, supra note 61.
2 A.B.A. Section of Taxation, supra note 232.
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death of seven of them in committee.' The survivor was enacted
as part of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act"
and prohibited discriminatory property taxation against railroads."'
A similar flurry of proposals and absence of enactments occurred
during the Ninety-third Congress. One Senate bill would have
granted congressional permission for states to enter the Multi-
state Tax Compact.' Counterpoised to that proposal was another
House bill which addressed uniform standards of state taxing
jurisdiction.'" The provisions of the House bill were similar to its
Ninetieth Congress predecessor, H.R. 2158,'" and to its Ninety-
fifth Congress progeny, H.R. 669.' Congressional permission for
states to enter the Compact was not forthcoming, as the Senate
proposal did not pass. The proponents of a nationally uniform
state jurisdictional standard were antagonistic toward the advo-
cates of the Compact, which they perceived as a usurpation of
federal authority.'" The validity of their concern remained un-
settled until 1978 when the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Compact in United States Steel Corp.
v. Multistate Tax Commission.'" The Court specifically found that
- H.R. 15,694, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (to establish a committee to
study the reduction of state and local dependence on property taxes); H.R. 10,979,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (to prevent state tax discrimination against rail-
roads and to declare certain taxation activities to be undue burdens on inter-
state commerce as applied to railroads); S. 3374, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
(to allocate income of air carrier employees based on flight time over state);
S. 3162, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (same as S. 3374); H.R. 2004, H.R. 3584,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to limit state and local income taxation of non-
residents); H.R. 1748, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (to exempt federal employees
from income taxation by states other than the employee's state of residence);
H.R. 1043, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (same as H.R. 2004 and H.R. 3548,
but also to allocate income to state where earned). All died except H.R. 10,979.
See note 232 supra.
"Pub. L. No. 94-210 (1976), 90 Stat. 31 (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 801
to 854).
.. See 49 U.S.C.A. S 26c (Supp. 1979) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, S
4(b), 92 Stat. 1466 (1978)).
"'S. 2092, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 10, cl. 3:
"No State shall, without the Consent of Congress .... enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State .. "
m"H.R. 1453, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
"'H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
'H.R. 669, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See text accompanying notes 224-
230 supra.
'2 See, e.g., Celler, supra note 173, at 399.
2"434 U.S. 452 (1978).
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the Compact did not enhance state power in a manner which en-
croached on federal supremacy. "
Although the dissent in United States Steel urged that to up-
hold the constitutionality of the Compact would preclude Congress
from countermanding its provisions,'" the majority specifically
denied that such an effect would result." If the Court had held
that an appropriate enactment of legislation under the commerce
power could not override the Compact, it would have accomplished
something which congressional proponents of bills authorizing the
Compact had been unable to do since its inception. On the other
hand, if the Court had determined that the Compact violated the
constitutional prohibition against states' entering agreements with-
out congressional approval," ' it would have invalidated the only
serious steps which have been taken to solve the burden on inter-
state commerce which results from the lack of uniform state taxa-
tion. The opponents of the Compact would have received a victory,
granted by the judiciary, which has not been obtainable through
the political process. By upholding the Compact, while simultane-
ously affirming the ultimate authority of Congress to alter, to
modify, or to reject it, the Court left responsibility for action in
this area squarely on the legislative branch. The Court thus re-
fused to resolve the conflict between state sovereignty and the need
for uniform taxation, implicitly calling on Congress to assume re-
sponsibility for balancing the respective interests, and arriving at
a solution.
CONCLUSIONS
As the importance of sales and use taxes to state governments
increases, and tax bases are broadened, there is a valid concern
within the business sector that its share of the burden of taxation
will increase. The need for broader tax bases, combined with a
permissive trend of the Supreme Court toward taxation of inter-
state commerce will continue to lead states to extend their juris-
diction over nonresidents in order to increase revenues,'" and
Id. at 472.
Id. at 493 (White, J., dissenting).
2 Ild. at 480 n.3.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, S 10, cl. 3.
20 Peters, supra note 15; "It will be interesting to see how ingenious states,
.[45
"[u]nder the present posture of the law, the odds are stacked
heavily in favor of state sales and use taxation of multistate trans-
actions. '  The resulting tax liability of nonresident businesses
will accentuate the need for a uniform system of taxation, which
will be impossible to achieve so long as the states act individually.
Although the Multistate Tax Compact is the only significant effort
toward unification in the area of sales and use taxes, its absence
of a jurisdictional standard and its reliance on voluntary enact-
ment by the states hamper its effectiveness.
The trend of the judiciary toward a narrow reading of the
commerce clause reflects a movement toward a single constitutional
standard against which to measure the validity of all types of
state taxation which affect interstate commerce. That the standard
is expressed in expansive language highlights the need for statu-
tory establishment of jurisdictional taxation standards. The de-
creased importance of categorization and labeling as bases for
determining the legality of a levy reflects an economically realistic
view of taxation in general. It also indicates an institutional view
that it is the role of the legislative branch to balance the interests
of state sovereignty over state taxation against the costs to inter-
state commerce of lack of uniform taxation. The decision in
United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission"' stands as
a clear statement that this type of weighing of interests must be
done by the Congress and not by the judiciary. Although the con-
flict is far from resolved,"' the balance tilts in favor of congres-
sional action to define minimum jurisdictional standards for state
and particularly local taxing jurisdictions, will be in concocting various privi-
leges upon which to tax interstate commerce." Id. at 307.
25 Barrett, supra note 34, at 27.
-1434 U.S. 452 (1978).
2 Id. at 486 (White, J., dissenting); "Indeed, the history of the Congress
and the Compact is a chronicle of jealous attempts of one to close out the
efforts of the other." Id. "A hostile stalemate characterizes the present position of
the parties." Id. at 488. See Multistate Tax Newsletter, Aug. 1972, No. 32 at 5:
Many tax administrators have maintained that the federal govern-
ment would allow the states to go their own way in administering
their own taxes regardless of whether or not the states worked to
eliminate compliance burdens and to improve uniformity among
their state statutes. It should be increasingly clear that Congress
will not continue lightly to countenance existing diversity either of
legislation or of administration with respect to state taxation of
multistate business.
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taxation of nonresidents, and to do so with great specificity, in
view of the limited potential for the Multistate Tax Compact to
achieve any meaningful uniformity.
The greatest area of variance in state sales and use taxes is
also the area in which states may exercise the greatest power, and
that is in granting specific exemptions from their taxing statutes.
The vast majority of states grant some form of exemption to cer-
tain aviation activities, but from a broad perspective they follow
no discernible pattern. There is no indication that the states will
relinquish their exercise of local discretion in this area, nor that
Congress would consider requiring them to do so. It falls upon
members of the industry to stay abreast of the host of specific
exemptions in order to make proper use of them.
COMMENTS
KEY TO TABLE OF
COMPARATIVE STATE TAX PROVISIONS
I. Mult. Comp.: Signatory to the Multistate Tax Compact.
II. Sales Basis
A. Passage of title determines place of sale.
B. Exchange of possession determines place of sale.
A.,B. Place of sale may be considered either as place of title pas-
sage or place of exchange.
III. Use Basis
A. Separate statutory statement of nexus.
B. No separate statutory statement of nexus.
C. Other-see footnotes.
IV. Apportionment
A. Separate statutory formula.
B. Credit for sales/use tax paid to another state.
C. Credit for sales/use tax paid to a state that grants reciprocal
credit.
D. Other basis for apportionment.
V. Exemptions
A. Specifically applicable to aircraft.
B. Exemptions applicable to manufacturers.
C. Exemptions applicable to carriers and other users.
D. General transportation exemptions including aircraft.
E. General transportation exemptions excluding aircraft.
F. Statutory incorporation of constitutional limitations.
G. Other-see footnotes.
VI. Miscellaneous
A. Specific taxes, not codified under general sales or use taxes, not
including general property taxes, specifically applicable to
aviation.
B. Direct use approach to avoid pyramiding.
C. Integration/component part approach to avoid pyramiding.
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TABLE OF COMPARATIVE STATE TAX PROVISIONS
State I. Mult. II. Sales Ill. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Ala. No A' B C,' D3  D,4E,5F C7
Ariz. No A,B' B B2  A,P A,B'
ALABAMA
'See Hamm v. Continental Gin Co., 276 Ala. 611, 165 So. 2d 393 (1964);
State v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 356 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Ct. App. 1978).
2 ALA. CODE 5 40-23-65 (1975).
3 ALA. CODE 5 40-21-61 (1975) (apportionment for express companies ac-
cording to miles travelled).
4 Id. § 40-23-4(8). Gross receipts from sales of transportation are exempt,
if the "rates and charges ... are customarily fixed and determined by the public
service commission of Alabama or like regulatory bodies." Id.
51d. 55 40-23-4(10), 40:23-4(12), 40-23-4(13), 40-23-4(28).
6 Id. 5 40-23-4(17).
"ld. S 40-23-I(a)(6).
ARIZONA
'See AIuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-1301 (Supp. 1957-1978).
2Id. 5 42-1409.A.2.
3 Id. 5 42-1312.01.A.6 (exemption for airplanes, navigational equipment, com-
munication equipment and accessories sold to certified carrier for intrastate,
interstate, or foreign commerce), 42-1312.0l.B.1 (exemption does not include
expendable property).
4 1d. § 42-1409.A.3.




State I. Mult. II. Sales M. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. . Basis Basis tionment tions
Ark. Yes1  A,B' B B3  A, F,5 B7




IARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-4101 (Supp. 1977). The audit provisions of the
Multistate Tax Compact were not enacted. Id. § 84-4106.
'1d. §§ 84-1902(c), 84-3104(f) (1947 & Supp. 1977).
3 No credit provisions are' statutorily set out other than those found in the
Multistate Tax Compact. Id. § 84-4101 (Supp. 1977).
" Id. § 84-3105(a). An exclusion is found in the tax imposition clause for
aircraft and aircraft equipment, and tangible personal property leased to aircraft
companies brought into the state solely for "refurbishing, conversion or modifi-
cation" if it is not intended for use within the state, and is not left in the state
more than sixty days-but if the intended use subsequent to storage is outside
the state, the sixty day limitation for the exemption does not apply. Id. Apparently
the exclusion was added to the statute as a result of a state court decision in
Skelton v. Federal Express Corp., 531 S.W.2d 941 (Ark. 1976) in which-an inter-
state cargo carrier was held liable for the use tax for repair parts brought into
the state, and applied to an aircraft which was also brought into the state solely
for the purpose of installing equipment to meet interstate air transportation safety
requirements. See generally ARK. STAT. ANN. S 84-3105(a) (Supp. 1977).
5 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-3106(A) (Supp. 1977).6 1d. § 84-3105.1 (D) (airplanes and navigational instruments belonging to




'See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE 5§ 19286, 25138, 26453c, 38001, 38006 (West
1970 & Supp. 1979).2 Id. S 6006 (West Supp. 1979).
3 Id. § 6406 (West 1970).
41d. § 6283 (West Supp. 1979).
'Id. S 6366.1 (West 1970) (repair and component parts for certain leased
aircraft).
61d. §§ 6359.1 (West Supp. 1979) (meals served to passengers), 32054 (West
1970) (alcoholic beverages for sale on board aircraft).
7 Id.'§ 6352 (West 1970).
81d. 5§ 6281-6285 (West Supp. 1979).
9 Id. § 7380 (West 1970) (special tax on aircraft jet fuel).
"
0 See generally CAL. REv. & TAX. COonE S 6366.1 (West 1970) (repair parts
and component parts for aircraft to be used in interstate commerce).
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- , VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Colo. Yes' A,B' B Ba E,I X-C4
Conn. No B1  A B3 C,A' A!
F,6 G'
D.C. No A,B1  A2 B3  C,4D3 Ca
E, F
COLORADO
ICOLO. REV. STAT. SS 24-60-1301 to 24-60-1307 (1973).
2Id. § 39-26-102(10) (Supp. 1979).
3id. S 39-26-203(1)(k) (1973).
4 Id. § 39-26-203 (Supp. 1979) (trailers, trucks, and mobile homes purchased
for use outside the state).
5Id. §§ 39-26-114, 39-26-203(1)(e) (Supp. 1979).
61d. S 41-2-101 (1973) (registration and taxation of aircraft).
71d. § 39-26-102(20).
CONNECTICUT
ISee CONN. GEN. STAT. S 12-407(2) (1979).
2Id. S 12-407(15).
'Id. S 12-430(5).
1 Id. 5 12-412(t) (certified air carriers using their craft in interstate com-
merce).
'Id.
'Id. S 12-412(a).TId. § 12-431 (casual sale not ordinarily reached by use tax---casual sales of
aircraft specifically taxable).
8 Id. § 12-243 (Air Carriers Tax).
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
I See D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 42-601.17 (West Supp. 1978-1979).
2Id. 5 47-2701.8.
1Id. 5 47-2706(c) (West 1968).
4Id. S 47-2605(j) (West Supp. 1978-1979) (food sales to passengers).
5Id. §§ 47-2701.1(b)(1), 47-2701.1(b)(5) (transportation not a "sale"-
exemption for property "in or upon or as part of" any aircraft in interstate use).
61d. § 47-2701.1(b)(4) (sales to common carrier of repair parts).
7 Id. 47-2706(c) (West 1968).
'Id. § 47-2601.14(a).
COMMENTS
State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Fla. No' A,B' B A,' B4  A,'B" '  B' CO
Ga. No A,B' A' C3  B4 C''6 A7 Be
Hawaii Yes' A,B' B A3 D' C E5 A' C7
FLORIDA
I The Multistate Tax Compact was repealed in 1976. 1976 Fla. Laws ch.
76-199, 51.
'See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.02(2) (a) (West Supp. 1979).
3id. S 212.08(9); id. § 212.08(8)(a) (ratio of miles travelled as basis of
apportionment, if carrier is regulated by federal authorities).
'Id. § 212.08(11) (specific credit applicable to aircraft sold to purchaser out
of state by seller domiciled in state-use tax credit for tax paid to purchaser's
state).
OId. §§ 212.08(7)(n) (West 1971), 212.08(11) (West Supp. 1979).
Old. § 212.06(5)(a) (West Supp. 1979) (manufacture of aircraft and repair
parts for sale in another state not taxed).
'See L. B. Smith Aircraft Corp. v. Green, 94 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1957) (air-
craft repair parts not exempt when applied in state to interstate carriers aircraft).
'See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 212.02(3)(c) (West Supp. 1979), 212.08(4)
(West 1971).
'ld. § 212.08(5)(b) (West Supp. 1979) (capital machinery for new or ex-
panding business).
GEORGIA
I See GA. CODE ANN. § 92-3403aB (Supp. 1979).
2Id. §§ 92-121 (1974) (jurisdictional definition for general taxing authority
of the state), 92-122 (property owned by resident, located out of state and subject
to foreign tax not reachable by Georgia tax).
1Id. S 92-3412a (Supp. 1979).
1 Id. § 92-3403aC(2) (q) (exemption for aircraft and repair parts for aircraft
owned by authorized common carrriers used principally to cross the borders to the
state to transport passengers or cargo).
sId. 5 92-3403aC(2)(p).
'Id. 5 92-3403aC(2) (j) (transportation made in connection with interstate
commerce).
Id. S 92-1501a (1974) (specific property tax on certain aircraft equipment).
I Id. 5 92-3403aC(2) (m).
HAWAn
I See HAWAn REV. STAT. 5 255-1 (1976).
2Id. §5 237-1, 237-13(l)(A), 237-13(2)(A).
'Id. §§ 237-21 (source of income), 238-3 (use tax).
41d. 5 237-24(20) (food to interstate common carrier passengers and crews).
Id. § 238-1(4) (interstate vessel owners).
0 Id. § 239-5 (public service company tax law).
7 Id. § 237-4(2), 238-2(l).
1980]
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Idaho Yes' A' B B3 F GO B,C'
Ill. No' A AS B4  B,C CO
Ind. No AA A 20,5 B4  CO D' B1 C'
EP
IDAHO
1See IDAHO CODE S 63-3701 (1976).
2Id. S 63-3612.
sId. § 63-3621(1).
'Id. § 63-3622(a) (Supp. 1979).
Old. § 63-3616(c) (1976). "Use" does not include keeping property for
transfer outside the state, or for incorporating the property into other proprety
to be transferred outside the state. Id.
Old. S 63-3622(d) (Supp. 1979).
ILLINOIS
'The Multistate Tax Compact was repealed in 1975. 1975 Ill. Laws 79-639,
ch. 120, § 440.
'See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 440 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
3 Id. ch. 120, S 439.3.
4Id.
5 Id. ch. 120, § 441. (included as limitation on imposition clause rather than
exemption).
I Id. ch. 120, S5 439.2, 440.
INDIANA
'See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2-1-38(a), 6-2-1-1(k) (Burns Supp. 1978).
2Id. §5 6-2-1-44, 6-2-1-47 (Burns 1978) (dealing with out-of-state seller's
responsibilities for collection).
'Id. § 6-2-1-38(q) (Bums Supp. 1978) (isolated sales of registered aircraft
specifically considered retail sales and therefore subject to tax).
41d. § 6-2-1-45(b) (Burns 1978)
'ld. § 6-2-1-38(q) (Burns Supp. 1978).
6 Id. § 6-2-1-39(b) (25) (non-registered aircraft for transportation to another
state and use outside Indiana).
7 Id. § 6-2-1-39(b)(4) (Bums 1978). Exemption for "[tihe sale, storage, use,
or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property or service which
is directly used or consumed in the rendering of public transportation of persons
or property." Id.





State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use
Comp. Basis Basis
IV. Appor- V. Exemp-
tionment tions
Iowa No A,W A' B3 E P1
Kan. Yes1  B2 B
Ky. No A,B1  B




1 See IowA CODE ANN. S 422.42(2) (Supp. 1979-1980
'Id. S 423.2 (1971). Use tax is "applicable where
furnished, or performed in this state, or where the pro(
used in this state." Id.
'Id. S 423.25.
'Id. S 422.45(10) (Supp. 1979-1980) (rolling stock).
'Id. § 422.45(1).
'Id. 55 324.82, 328.42, 330A.15, 422.112.7Id. 55 422.42(3), 423.1(1)(a) (1971).
services are rendered,
duct of such service is
KANSAS
IKAN. STAT. ANN. 55 79-4301 to 79-4307 (1977).
'Id. S 79-3602(c) (Supp. 1978).
'Id. §§ 79-3704(c), 79-3705 (1977).
"Id. § 79-3606(g) (1977 & Supp. 1978) (sales of aircraft, aircraft repair and
replacement parts for use in interstate or foreign commerce).
'Id. S 79-3606(k) (non-registered aircraft for immediate export).
11d. § 79-3603(f) (Supp. 1978) (railroad and other public utility movable
stock for use directly in interstate commerce).71d. § 79-3602(1).
KENTUCKY
ISee Ky. REV. STAT. § 139.120 (1971).
21d. S 139.510 (limit on amount of credit of $1,000).




'See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:301(12) (West 1970).
2Id. § 47:306.1 (option for interstate transportation dealers to apportion under
a mileage formula).
Id. § 47:305.21A (West Supp. 1979). "The sales and use taxes imposed by
the state of Louisiana . . . shall not apply to purchases of airplane equipment,
airplane parts, and airplanes of any commuter airline domiciled in the state of
Louisiana." Id.
4Id. § 47:305(5) (West 1970) ("nor is it the intention of this chapter to
levy a tax on bona fide interstate commerce").
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment lions
Me. No B1 13 C A3 D4  A! B'C
Md. No AR' A B B,C
4  C?




'See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, 5 1752.13 (1978).
21d. S 1862.
SId. § 1760.27 (aircraft sales for immediate transportation out of state).
I d. S 1765 (isolated sales exemption).
5 Id. 5 1760.
6 Id. S§ 1480-1491.
I d. 5 1760.31 ("direct use" exemption for new equipment).
Id. §5 1752.11, 1752.16.
MARYLAND
'See MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, S 324(d) (1957).
Ild. S 374A (Supp. 1978) (establishing minimum degree of "storage" which
gives rise to use tax).
3Id. S 375(c) (1957).
4Id. 5 326(gg) (Supp. 1978) (exempting sales of aircraft and repair parts
for aircraft "which will be used principally in the movement of passengers or
freight or both, in interstate and foreign commerce").
I Id. 5 326(n) (1957) (exempting sales of transportation services).
6Id. 5 326(f).
7 1d. S 324(f)(iii) (Supp. 1978).
MASSACHUSETTS
'See MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 64H, 5 1(12)(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978).
2Id. § 1(5); MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 641, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 &
Supp. 1978).
3 See MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 641, § 7(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978).
"See MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 64H, 5 6(o) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978).
1 Id. 5 6(a).
6 Id. 5 6(c) (casual sales exemption not applicable to aircraft).
7Id. 55 6(r), 1(12)(b).
COMMENTS
State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Mich. Yes' A2 C C11 A' 7 E" Co
F6
Minn. No A,B1  B B1 A' B' A7 B8
F Go
Miss. No A,B A' B E 4 F A'- B9
MICHIGAN
I MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 205.581 (Supp. 1979-1980).
2d. 5 205.51.
3 Id. S 205.93 (casual sales of aircraft-payment of use tax required prior to
transfer of registration).
IId. 5 205.94(e).
5Id. § 205.94(b) (1967).
'Id. 5 205.54a(g) (Supp. 1979-1980).
7 Id. 5 205.93 (exemption for certain intrafamilial transfers and gifts of air-
craft).
'Id. 55 205.54a(e), 205.94(1) (1967).
MINNESOTA
'See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.01(3)(a) (West Supp. 1978).
'Id. 5 297A.24.
31d. 55 297A.25(1)(m), 297A.25(1)(t) (exemption of air flight equipment
taxable under separate ad valorem tax--exemption on sales to licensed aircraft
dealers).
4Id. § 297A.25 (1) (1) (rolling stock exemption).
'Id. 5 297A.25(1)(c).
Old. 55 297A.25(1)(k), 297A.255.
71d. 55 270.071 to 270.079 (West 1969 & Supp. 1978).
8Id. 5 297A.25(h) (West Supp. 1978).
MississiPPi
1See Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-65-3(f) (Supp. 1978).
2id. 55 27-67-3(k), 27-67-11 (1972) (minimum contacts to require collec-
tion of tax, but not a comprehensive statement of limitations on state's taxing
power).
'Id. 5 27-67-7.
"Id. 5 27-65-17(a)(3) to 27-65-7(a)(8), 27-65-29(d)(2) (exemptions for
vessels and rolling stock).
5Id. 5 27-65-29 (Supp. 1978).
Ild. 5 27-65-17 (tax rate on aircraft transactions different than other trans-
actions).
'ld. 5 27-65-23 (5% gross income tax on aviation repair).
Bd. §§ 27-35-701 to 27-35-711 (1972) (separate ad valorem property tax
applicable exclusively to airline company aircraft).
9Id. §5 27-65-29(a)(4), 27-65-101(b).
1980]
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Mo. Yes1  A,B2 B B3  A,C' C B8 C9
D6 F?
Neb. Yes' A,B B C A F Co
Nev. Yes' A,B2  B B3  F C5
MISSOURI
1 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 32.200 (Vernon 1969).
'1d. § 144.010 (Vernon 1976).
3 id. S 144.615(5).
'Id. § 144.040.2 (exemption for sales of aircraft "for storage or for use in
interstate commerce" if purchaser is certified by CAB).
51d. § 144.020.1(7) (separate rate of taxation for sales of intrastate aviation
tickets).
'Id. 5 144.030.3(2) (replacement parts and component parts of aircraft, and
rolling stock used as common carriers).
7 Id. § 144.030.1 (Vernon Supp. 1979).
8 Id. § 144.030.3(4) (new and expanding industries).
9 Id. § 144.030.3(1)
NEBRASKA
NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2901 (1976).
3 Id. S 77-2702(8).
aid. § 77-2704(4) (Supp. 1978).
4 Id. 5 77-2704(3)(a) (aircraft repair parts brought into state for incorpora-
tion into common carriers).
51d. § 77-2704(1)(a).
6Id. § 77-2702(11)(a) (1976).
NEVADA
1NEv. REV. STAT. § 376.010 (1973).
2 Id. 5 372.060.
I Id. § 376.010 (art. V of the Multistate Tax Compact); see also ARIZ. Arr'v
GEN. Op. No. 476 (1968).
4 NEv. REV. STAT. S 372.265 (1973).
5 Id. § 372.080 (property which is to be incorporated into other tangible per-




State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use
Comp. Basis Basis
N.J. No A,B' B




N.M. Yes' A,B A' B3 ]D C5 Do
E7 F
NEW JERSEY
I See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-2(f) (West Supp. 1979).
2Id. § 54:32B-11(b).
'Id. § 54:32B-8(h) (sales of airplane fuel to airlines).
4 1d. § 54:32B-8(k) (transportation of persons or property).
'Id. 5 54:32B-11.
'Id. § 54:32B-8(l), 54:32B-8(bb).
7 Id. 5 54:32B-8(j).
'Id. 5 54:32B-8(m)(1) (deleted by 1970 N.J. Laws ch. 7,
1977 N.J. LAws ch. 18, § 1).
5; re-enacted by
NEW MEXICO
'N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15A-37 (Supp. 1975).
21d. § 72-16A-10 (for collection duty, but not general liability).
3id. § 72-16A-16.
41d. 5 72-16A-14.10 (deduction for transactions in interstate commerce).
51d. § 72-16A-14.27 (exempting "transportation of passengers or property
for hire in interstate commerce under the regulations or authorization of any
agency of the United States").
6Id. § 72-16A-14.11A (exempting receipts from interstate transportation, and
from intrastate transportation and service "reasonably necessary" to interstate
transportation).
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State I. Mult. II. Sales I. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
N.Y. No A,B B C2 A' A7 B1 C'
A,B,C
Ole
N.C. No A,W A! A,B' A D5 Ce
N.D. Yes' A,B' B C3 D4 E C
NEw YORK
1See N.Y. TAx LAw § 1101(b)(5) (McKinney 1975).
2id. § 1118(7)(a).
3Id. § 1105(c)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1978). The imposition clause of the
tax for installation and service of tangible personal property excludes aircraft
maintenance and repair parts for "commercial aircraft primarily engaged in
intrastate, interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
4 1d. § 1115(a)(21) (commercial aircraft, repair parts and flight simulators).
Ild. § 3 (McKinney 1966) (corporations exclusively engaged in operation
of aircraft in foreign commerce exempted from taxes on earnings, capital stock
and franchises).
Old. S 1115(a)(8) (McKinney 1975).
"Id. § 183 (McKinney Supp. 1978) (franchise tax on transportation corpora-
tion).
'Id. § 1115(c) (McKinney 1975) (gas, electricity, etc.).
OId. § 1118(4).
NORTH CAROLINA
'See N.C. GEN. STAT. S 105-164.3(15) (1972).
21d. S 105-164.3(10), 105-164.8.
'Id. 5 105-164.6(4).
41d. 5 105-164.4(1) (Supp. 1977) (different tax rate on sale of aircraft in
imposition clause, with limit of credit set at $120).
5Id. § 105-164.14 (detailed statutory apportionment scheme based on mile-
age).
6Id. § 105-164.13(8) (1972).
NORTH DAKOTA
'N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-59-01 (1972).
OId. § 57-39.2-01.2.
3Id. S 57-40.2-11.
4 d. § 57-39.2-04.2 (Supp. 1977) (transportation of persons or property pro-
vided by common carrier).
5d. 5 57-40.2-04.5 (1972) (rolling stock exemption).
6 Id. § 57-39.2-04.1.
7 id. 5 57-39.2-01.3 (Supp. 1977).
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State I. Mult. II. Sales Ill. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Ohio No A,B A! B3  D4 E5 C7
Okla. No A,B' A2 C3  B,C4  Be C'
R.I. No A,B1  B B' E3 F4  B7 CS
OHIO
'See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 5 5739.01(B) (Page Supp. 1978).
21d. S 5741.01(H)' (Page 1973).
3 1d. § 5741.02(C)(5) (Page Supp. 1978).
4 Id. § 5739.02(B)(11) (exempts sales of transportation of persons or prop-
erty).
5 Id. § 5739.02(B) (14) (Page 1973) (ships and vessels in interstate commerce).
61d. S 5739.02(B)(10) (Page Supp. 1978).
7Id. § 5739.01(E)(2).
OKLAHOMA
See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, S 1302(c) (West 1966).
I1d. § 1407 (West Supp. 1978).
'Id. § 1404(c) (West 1966).
'Id. § 1404(g) (exempts "any article of tangible personal property used or
to be used by commercial airlines").
5See In re Woods Corp., 531 P.2d 1381 (Okla. 1975) (shipment of plane
into state, purchaser to use it exclusively in interstate commerce-taxable moment
upon delivery and prior to departure).
6 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 130 5 (p) (West 1966) (direct use approach
to avoid pyramiding for new industries).
'Id. § 1305(o 2).
RHODE ISLAND
'See R.I. GEN. LAws § 44-18-7.A (1971).
2 Id. S 44-18-30.A.
3 Id. S 44-18-30.W (Supp. 1979).
4/d. § 44-18-30.A (1971).
5 /d. 5 44-3-3(20) (exemption from ad valorem property tax on aircraft on
which registration fee has been paid).
O/d. §§ 44-18-20(a) to 44-18-20(w) (Supp. 1979) (certain casual sales of
,aircraft and other property not included within tax imposition section).
'Id. 5 44-18-30.W (Supp. 1979).
8Id. 5 44-18-30.H (1971).
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
S.C. No A' A! C3 E 4 F B,C-
S.D. Yes1  B2 B C3 D E A"P
Tenn. No A,B B B2 C A,B,C' B,C'
E' F G
SOUTH CAROLINA
'See S.C. CODE S 12-35-100 (1977).
2 Id. S 12-35-80 (definition of retailer maintaining place of business within
this state). But see id. S 12-35-810 (imposing the use tax "regardless of whether
the retailer is or is not engaged in business in this State"); see also id. S 12-35-830






1 S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 10-54-1 (Supp. 1978).
'Id. 5 10-45-1(7) (1969).
3Id. 5510-46-6.1, 10-46-34.1 (Supp. 1978).
4 Id. 10-45-12 (1969) (exempting sales of transportation).
5 Id. 5 10-46-10.
6 Id. §510-45-9, 10-46-7.
7Id. § 10-29-1 to 10-29-17 (1969 & Supp. 1978) (separate taxation provisions
for airline flight property).
11d. § 10-45-3.1 (Supp. 1978) (tax on sale of aircraft used for agricultural
spraying).
TENNESSEE
'See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3002(b) (Supp. 1978).
21d. 5 67-3008 (1976).
'Id. § 67-3002(c)1, 67-3007 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
4Id. § 67-3012(7) (Supp. 1978).
'Id. 5 67-3012(7) (exemption for parts, accessories and supplies used by
commercial air carriers who perform no intrastate services); see also Federal
Express Corp. v. Woods, 569 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1978) (interstate carrier not
within exemption for performing even de minimis intrastate business).
OId. 5 67-3012(8), 67-3012(a)(3) (Supp. 1978).
7Id. 5 67-3002(i) (1976) (casual sales of aircraft specifically included in
tax imposition clause).
'Id. S 67-3002(c)(2) (Supp. 1978).
COMMENTS
State I. Mult. HI. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Tex. Yes' A,B' B C 3  A 4 0 C,
0F Ga
Utah Yes' A,B' B B 3  D 4 F' C6
Va. No A,B B B' C' A,C4  A 8 Co
E G"7
ITEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7359(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
'See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. tit. 122A, art. 20.01(G) (Vernon 1969); id. art.
20.01 (K) (1) (a).
'Id. art. 20.04(J).
4 Id. art. 20.04(Q) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
'Id. art. 20.04(G) (Vernon 1969).
'Id. art. 20.04(P) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
7 Id. art. 20.04(C) (Vernon 1969).
Id. art. 20.04(G) (3) (d) (exemption for repair parts for any "self-propelled
vehicle which is a licensed and certified common carrier of persons or property").
9Id. art. 20.04(E).
UTAH
'UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-22-1 (1974).
2Id. § 59-15-2(b).
'Id. § 59-16-4(h) (Supp. 1979).
41d. § 59-15-4(b)(1) (exemption for intrastate movement of freight).
5Id. § 59-15-6(1) (Supp. 1979); id. § 59-16-4(b) (1974).
VIRGINIA
'See VA. CODE § 58-441.2(b) (Supp. 1979).
SId. 5 58-441.8 (1974).
3Id. 5 58-441.6(i) (Supp. 1979).
4 Id. 5 58-441.6(v) (exemption for sale or lease of property to airline pro-
viding interstate common carrier service).
51d. § 58-441.6(t).
1 Id. § 58-441.6(x) (exemption for aircraft taxed under Virginia Aircraft Sales
and Use Tax).
7 Id. § 58-685.31 (exemption from separate Virginia Aircraft Sales and Use Tax
available to certified air carriers).
sId. §§ 58-685.27 to 58-685.38 (Virginia Aircraft Sales and Use Tax).
9 Id. § 58-441.6.
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State I. Mult. II. Sales III. Use IV. Appor- V. Exemp- VI. Misc.
Comp. Basis Basis tionment tions
Wash. Yes' A,B- B B3 A,C' AT Ca
C,D'
P
W. Va. No A,B B I C A' B




'WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 5 82.56.010 (Supp. 1979).
'Id. SS 82.04.040, 82.08.010(4) (1962 & Supp. 1979).
'Id. S 82.12.035 (Supp. 1979).
4 1d. §§ 82.08.030(11), 82.12.030(4) (sales of airplanes for use in transport-
ing persons and property for hire in interstate commerce or for conducting com-
mercial deep sea fishing).
5Id. S 82.08.030(10) (sale of property to common carrier by air, rail or
water in interstate or foreign commerce).
OId. 55 82.08.030(4), 82.12.030(5).
Id. § 82.48.020 (aircraft excise tax).
Old. 5 82.04.050.
WEST VIRGINIA
'See W. VA. CODE S 11-15-2(4) (1974).
'There is no separate statutory provision to prevent multistate taxation.
1id. § 11-15A-3.3 (exemption for use of "[t]angible personal property, the
gross receipts from the sale of which are derived from the sale of machinery,
supplies, and materials to . . . persons engaged in the business of . . . trans-
portation").
'Id. SS 11-12A-1 to 11-12A-22 (Annual Tax on Incomes of Certain Carriers).
5Id. 5 11-15-9(8), -9(9).
WISCONSIN
'See Wis. STAT. ANN. S 77.51(4) (West Supp. 1979).
'Id. S 77.53(3) (collection responsibilities).
'Id. 5 77.53(16).
4 Id. § 77.54(5) (a) (aircraft, including accessories, sold to persons who use





State I. Mult. H7. Sales III. Use
Comp. Basis Basis
Wyo. No A,B B
COMMENTS




'See WYo. STAT. § 39-6-402(a)(iii) (1977).
2 No credit provisions for taxes paid to other states.
1d. § 39-6-405(a)(iv) (exempting interstate transportation).
4 Id. § 39-6-505(a) (x) (exempting aircraft purchased by certified air carriers).
Id. §5 39-6-405(a)(xv), 39-6-505(a)(iii).
I d. 5 39-6-404(a) (iv) (imposition of tax only upon intrastate transportation
of freight and passengers).
" Id. §§ 39-6-405(a) (i), 39-6-505(a) (viii).
VI. Misc.
C7

